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t's no secret that people change more slowly than 
the conditions of the society in which they live. On 
the whole, people retain the same convictions that 
were considered progressive when they were young, 
and later in life seemed to be current, but already seem 
old-fashioned, if not obsolete, to the younger 
generations entering public life. After the collapse of 
the USSR it took almost ten years for the last 
remaining representatives of the old government 
establishment to forsake the upper echelons of power 
in the new state. Just five years ago, three out of the 
four highest government offices in Russia were held by 
people who once were former members and candidates 
for membership in the Politburo of the Central 
Committee. Even now former Soviet Communist Party 
and government officials retain their influence in 
parliament and a considerable number of regions in 
Russia. On the one hand, such a slow transfer of power 
facilitates the sort of evolutionary process, which 
according to Yegor Gaidar, is undoubtedly better than 
any sort of revolution. On the other hand, keeping in 
power people who adhere to the old stereotypes is not 
always good for the introduction of new models of 
government or the formation of new social values.
In this essay I will address the phenomenon of the 
existence of an internal ideology in the party and 
governmental elite of the USSR, an ideology that 
largely contradicts the officially declared slogans, and 
which is based on an entire complex of myths, 
including, among others, ethno-nationalist myths.
Non-Transparency as the Fundamental
Condition for Myth-Making
How can we explain the appearance of these 
myths? In the USSR the procedure for decision-making 
by the party-state apparatus was, on the one hand, 
bureaucratically formalized; on the other hand, this 
formal process was not followed (recall the 
phenomenon that came to be known as “telephone 
law”). As a result, lobby groups wielded enormous 
influence. The more non-transparent a certain
department appeared to the outside observer, the 
greater the significance enjoyed by its lobbyists.
Two factors worked in tandem (the non-transparent 
process of decision-making and the prohibition on 
public discussion), among people who were 
uninformed but interested, to give birth to a mythology 
that seemingly helped them understand the “essence” 
of what was taking place. And what was “taking place” 
in the party-state apparatus markedly differed from 
what was stated by official propaganda and what 
“ordinary people” knew.
The double standards in the work of the apparatus 
of the Central Committee and other central departments 
(with respect both to people “on the street” and one's 
colleagues), facilitated by the differing degrees in 
access to information, engendered a dual attitude 
regarding ideological questions. One the one hand, all 
officials of the central departments took part in the 
obligatory party meetings, paid membership dues and 
read the newspaper Pravda; on the other hand, they 
had their own individual sympathies in questions of 
politics and culture, which certainly did not always 
coincide with the directives voiced at the party 
meetings.
Personal preferences on social and political issues 
and values, in conjunction with the need to somehow 
explain the present-day conditions that did not in any 
way reflect official pronouncements (that is, in essence, 
informational hunger) lent authority to various myths 
in the party-state apparatus. For a number of reasons, 
both social and political, the ethno-nationalist myth 
about the perfidious Jew became one of the most 
popular. A significant number of officials in the party- 
state apparatus had recourse to this myth to explain the 
domestic political situation in the USSR. Moreover, the 
myth's simplicity and universality made it easy to 
apply to any and all situations, thus boosting the 
myth's usefulness and popularity. This explains why 
instead of following the slogans and actually 
conducting an internationalist (that is, non-ethnic) 
politics within the country, the party apparatus as a 
whole was indulgent in regard to the actions of the
20
Russian nationalist movement; moreover, dozens of 
officials in the Central Committee and other central 
departments took an active part in this movement.
Reasons for Ethnic Xenophobia
in the Soviet Party-State Apparatus
Ethno-nationalism and, in particular, Russian 
nationalism in the USSR was a rather widespread 
phenomenon. But it acquired organized, though rather 
amorphous forms only in the 1960s—as the movement 
of Russian nationalists. The movement's principal 
founders were officials in the party-state apparatus, as 
well as members of the creative and humanities 
intelligentsia.
The transformation of the Russian Communist 
Party from a pre-revolutionary and revolutionary party, 
comprised of members of the intelligentsia who 
believed in the possibility of the social brotherhood of 
all peoples, independent of ethnic membership, into an 
ethno-nationalist party, as it became in the years 1949-
53, represents an interesting and complex process that 
has attracted the attention of many historians.1 In my
1 The most comprehensive monograph on this subject, which both 
takes into account previous work and incorporates an enormous 
amount of new information is G. Kostyrchenko's Tainaia politika 
Stalina. Vlast' i antisemitizm (M, 2001). See also: M. Agurskii, 
Ideologiia natsional-bol'shevizma (Paris, 1980); K. Azadovskii, and 
B. Egorov, “Kosmopolity,” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2 (1999); 
Ia. Aizenshtandt, O podgotovke Stalinym genotsida evreev 
(Jerusalem, 1994); A. V. Blium, Evreiskii vopros pod sovetskoi 
tsenzuroi (St. Petersburg, 1996); N. Bugai and D. Merkulov, Narody 
i vlast': “Sotsialisticheskii eksperiment” (20-e gody), (1994); N. 
Bugai and A. Gonov, Kavkaz: narody v eshelonakh (20-60-e 
gody)(M, 1998); N. Bugai, “Deportatsiia narodov - repressivnaia 
mera gosudarstvennoi politiki v sfere natsional'nykh otnoshenii. 20- 
40-e gody,” Krainosti istorii i krainosti istorikov (M, 1997), 157-73; 
V. Buldakov, “Revoliutsiia i chelovek,” Krainosti istorii, 21-40; A. 
Vishnevskii, Serp i rubl': Konservativnaia modernizatsiia v SSSR 
(M, 1998); E. Gromov, Stalin: vlast' i iskusstvo (M, 1998); L. 
Gurevich, Totalitarizm protiv intelligentsii (Alma-Ata, 1992); N. 
Kirsanov, “Natsional'nye formirovaniia Krasnoi Armii v VOV 1941-
1945 gg.,” Otechestvennaia istoriia, 4 (1995):116-25; G. 
Kostyrchenko, V plenu u krasnogo faraona. Politicheskie 
presledovaniia evreev v SSSR v poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie (M, 
1994); T. Iu. Krasovitskaia, “O stalinskoi formulovke natsii v 
kontekste vremeni i mesta ee sushchestvovaniia,” Krainosti istorii, 
129-45; Landa R. Mirsaid, “Sultan-Galiev,” Voprosy istorii, 8 
(1999):53-70; L. Liuks, “Evreiskii vopros v politike Stalina,” 
Voprosy istorii, 7 (1999):41-59; M. Narinskii, “Kak eto bylo,” 
Drugaia voina (M, 1996), 32-60; Natsional'naia politika Rossiia: 
istoriia i sovremennost' (M, 1997); V. Nevezhin, Sindrom 
nastupatel'noi voiny. Sovetskaia propaganda v predverii 
“sviashchennykh boev,” 1939-1941 (M, 1997); R. Pikhoia, SSSR: 
istoriia vlasti. 1941-1991 (M, 1998); F. Silnitskii, Natsional'naia 
politika KPSS v period 1917-1922 (NY, 1981); F. Fiure, Proshloe 
odnoi illiuzii (M, 1998); S. Sakunov, NEP: evoliutsiia rezhima i 
rozhdenie natsional bol'shevizma, in Sovetskoe obshchestvo: 
vozniknovenie, razvitie, istoricheskii final, vol. 1 (M, 1997), 57-120; 
D. Brandenburg, National-Bolshevism. Stalinist Mass Culture and 
the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity (Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 2002); J. Brent, Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against 
the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953 (NY, 2003); S. Davies, Popular
opinion, the reasons for such a transformation are the 
following:
• the political and state structure of the 
USSR, in which the leading role was taken by 
a relatively small circle of officials, bound 
together by internal circumstances (discipline, 
secrecy) and external ones (informal and 
shadow relationships).2
• the social transformation of the 
1920s and 30s, during which large numbers of 
poorly educated children of peasants and 
workers joined the party, and later entered the 
party-state apparatus.3
• the personal ethno-nationalist views 
of the leader of the party and the state, Joseph 
Stalin.4
The Social Roots of Ethnic Myths
In the 1930s and 40s the “peasant children” who 
had relocated to the cities in an attempt to raise their 
social status and better their material circumstances 
actively participated in various “purges”; moreover, the 
people who were subjected to repression were largely 
those who stood out from the general masses by social 
indicators (origins, education, those who had relatives 
abroad), political affiliation (membership in pre-
revolutionary parties and oppositions, acquaintance 
with “enemies of the people”) or ethnic markers.
Since in the first post-revolutionary decade the 
party-state apparatus (like all other spheres that 
required intellectual achievement) was to a significant 
degree comprised of people of non-Slavic origins 
(above all, Jews and Caucasians), who replaced the 
former educated stratum that had been wiped out, it is 
not surprising that precisely they became the ones to be 
ousted in the late 1930s.5 * *In order to justify this 
practice a series of myths was elaborated (or adapted
Opinion in Stalin's Russia. Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-
1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997); A. Weiner, Making Sense 
of War (Princeton, 2001).
2 A. Vaksberg, “Personal'nye dela chlenov KPSS kak istoricheskii 
istochnik,” Otechestvennaia istoriia, 5 (1992): 91-104; Iu. Zhukov, 
“Bor'ba za vlast' v rukovodstve SSSR v 1945-1952 gg.,” Voprosy 
istorii, 1 (1995): 23-39; V. Izmozik, “Politicheskii kontrol' v 
Sovetskoi Rossii (1918-1928 gg.),” Voprosy istorii, 7 (1997): 32-52; 
N. Kozlova, “Tseny iz zhizni “osvobozhdennogo rabotnika,” Sotsis,
2 (1998):108-19; M. Levin, “Biurokratiia i stalinizm,” Voprosy 
istorii, 3 (1995):16-28; Pavlova, “Mekhanizm politicheskoi vlasti v 
SSSR v 20-30-e gody,” Voprosy istorii, 11-12 (1998):49-66.
3 See the works cited above by V. Buldakov, A. Vishnevskii, Iu. 
Zhukov and S. Tsakunov.
4 See the works cited above by M. Agurskii, E. Gromov and G. 
Kostyrchenko.
5 The following departments by 1953 had become completely “free 
of Jews,” Germans, as well as other “suspect” nationalities: the party
and central Komsomol bureaucracy, the main political
administrations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aviation, central 
radio (after 1953 the only department that again was open to Jews).
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from the past) that enjoyed wide circulation among 
mid- and high-level officialdom, but which for all 
practical purposes did not seep down to “the people.” 
Moreover, these very same “people,” largely believing 
the propaganda, did not even suspect the party-state 
apparatus's “internal ideology.”
According to historian Gennady Kostyrchenko, 
who has analyzed the closed archival records for the 
Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party 
(VKP[b]) and the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (KPSS) as well as the archives of the NKVD, 
the transition to a systematic policy of ethnic 
segregation, which manifested itself in the removal of 
people from important and prestigious posts in the 
party-state apparatus solely on account of their ethnic 
origins, was begun in 1937-38. In the preceding period 
the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party did 
betray its slogans in the pursuit of tactical aims, a 
practice that manifested itself in individual acts of 
ethnic discrimination that took place in the early 1920s. 
Systematic discrimination based on ethnicity also took 
place in many republics. However, at the general state 
level, as unspoken state policy, ethnic discrimination 
began to be put into practice only in 1937, when 
representatives of ethnic minorities, who “possessed a 
state outside the borders of the USSR,” were subjected 
to mass deportations from the border regions and 
arrests. In particular, 16 percent of Poles and 30 
percent of Latvians living in the country—the 
overwhelming majority of the adult male population— 
were subject to arrest and frequently execution.6 
Representatives of these ethnic groups were also 
removed from the party-state apparatus and the military 
complex; national schools for minorities were closed. 
In 1938 the Jewish population of the country, which 
comprised a significant portion of the party-state 
apparatus, was subjected to discrimination: Jews were 
no longer employable in the Central Committee of the 
All-Union Communist Party and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; on the contrary, measures were taken 
to remove them from these departments. The presence 
of Jews was sharply reduced in the NKVD, the Central 
Executive Committee of the USSR, and ministerial 
posts. In November 1938, Central Committee 
documents for the first time refer to Jews as “cadres 
that are soiling our institutions.”7 According to 
Kostyrchenko, this represents the beginning of the 
formulation on the part of the internal organs of the 
state of a mythology that attempted to explain ethnic 
discrimination as serving the interests of the state.
In my opinion, Kostyrchenko's explanation, which 
places full responsibility for the formulation of this 
myth on the Department of Leading Party Organs
6 G. Kostyrchenko, Tainaia politika Stalina, 132. 
7 Ibid., 203-8.
(ORPO), that is, on the Central Committee and the 
Directorate for Propaganda and Agitation, seems rather 
mechanistic.8 Especially since the author himself, on 
the whole, cites as the source of his information 
documents from the Central Committee of the All-
Union Communist Party, whereas the ethno-nationalist 
mythology was disseminated, by and large, through 
verbal channels. Therefore, we can establish only 
provisionally the time of the origins of the majority of 
the ethno-nationalist myths of the party-state apparatus; 
what is more important for us is that these myths 
remained in effect until the collapse of the USSR and 
served as the ideological foundation for the Russian 
nationalist movement.
A Generation of Officials
Who Grew Up in Xenophobia
Of particular interest for scholars who study the 
level of ethnic xenophobia in government organs is the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union—the center and headquarters of the 
party-state machine in which practically all the state's 
leaders and high-ranking officials worked at one time 
or another.
According to Yury Zhukov's research, during the 
postwar period the party's leaders were troubled by the 
nomenklatura's extremely low levels of education, a 
worry reflected in the resolution “On Measures for the 
Intensification of Party-Organizational Work,” dated 
July 8, 1946. Almost 70 percent of Communist Party 
members did not have even a high-school education; 
the situation among the nomenklatura was only slightly 
better.9 A practical solution to raising the qualifications 
of party and state officials became the education of 
hundreds of mid-level leaders (e.g., secretaries of 
oblast committees and city committees, heads of 
ministerial administrations) at retraining courses 
offered through the Central Committee and the Higher 
Party School. Many who received their first (and last) 
systematic education in these schools in 1947-52, went 
on to hold various and sometimes very high posts in 
the party-state apparatus in the 1950s-80s.10
Naturally, the goal of the training in these schools 
was not merely to raise the general level of education 
among the nomenklatura. The country was undertaking 
a serious change in domestic and foreign policy by 
increasing confrontation with the West and its search 
for internal enemies. The students of the Higher Party 
School and the retraining courses were informed of the 
newest secret instructions practically from the mouths
8 Ibid., 203-11.
9 Iu. Zhukov, “Bor'ba za vlast' v rukovodstve SSSR v 1945-1952 
gg.,” Voprosy istorii, 1 (1995):27.
10 See, for example, Vysshie organy vlasti i upravleniia i ikh 
rukovoditeli. 1923-1991 gg., edited by V. I. Ivkin (M, 1999).
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of those who were preparing them. All this, in my 
opinion, strongly influenced the students, and helped 
shape xenophobic stereotypes not only on the reflex 
level (I have heard the authority's opinion and have 
carried it out), but also on the level of worldview. An 
assortment of xenophobic stereotypes entered the 
system of values and acquired a mythologized 
structure.
That is one of the reasons, in my opinion, why 
ethnic xenophobia in the party-state apparatus in the 
1950s-80s remained in effect at the highest levels of 
power. After Beria's initiatives in 1953 (the resolution 
of the Doctors' Plot and the removal of barriers for 
members of the titular nations to hold appointments) 
and the indulgence shown the repressed nations in 
1956-62, no serious measures were taken to root out 
xenophobic attitudes.11 In the memoirs of eyewitnesses 
who worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party we find sufficient evidence of 
xenophobic tendencies in many of the country's 
leaders—from Khrushchev to Gorbachev12 and 
officials at various levels.
However, the majority of former staff members of 
the Central Committee, largely Slavic by ethnicity, in 
their memoirs, as a rule, mention xenophobia in 
passing, but rarely pause to reflect on this topic.13
11 On Beria's reforms that remained incomplete, see Iu. Zhukov, 
“Bor'ba za vlast' v partiino-gosudarstvennykh verkhakh SSSR 
vesnoi 1953 g.,” Voprosy istorii, 5-6 (1996):39-57; E. Zubkova, 
“Malenkov i Khrushchev: lichnyi factor v politike poslestalinskogo 
rukovodstva,” Otechestvennia istoriia, 4 (1995); A. Kokurin and A. 
Pozharov, “'Novyi kurs' L. P. Berii, Istoricheskii arkhiv, 4 
(1996):132-64; “Lavrentii Beriia: ‘Cherez 2-3 goda ia krepko 
ispravlius...' Pis'ma iz tiuremenogo bunkera,” Istochnik, 4 (1994):3- 
14; V. Naumov, “Byl li zagovor Berii? Novye dokumenty o 
sobytiiakh 1953 g.,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 5 (1998):17-39; M. 
Reiman, “N. S. Khrushchev i povorot 1953 g.,” Voprosy istorii, 12 
(1997):165-68.
12 According to the memoirs of V. Boldin, aide to Gorbachev,
Gorbachev is reported to have said that Andropov wasn't 
“completely gobbled up” by the domestic and foreign media, because 
he was “a half-breed, and they all stick together.” In another instance
Gorbachev gave Voldin instructions regarding an aide on
international affairs, A. Cherniaev: “Not everything is in order in his
family with entry No. 5 [i.e., the entry for nationality in the Soviet 
passport] in his family, so don't send him any top secret information, 
since it could “run off” quite far away.” See V. Boldin, Krushenie
p'edestala (M, 1995), 235, 376.
13 See, for example, A. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do
Gorbacheva (M, 1994); G. Arbatov, Zatianuvsheesia vyzdorovlenie 
(1953-85). Svidetel'stvo sovremennika (M, 1991); A. Grachev, 
Kremlevskaia khronika (M, 1994); M. Kodin, Tragediia Staroi 
ploshchadi (M, 1999); V. Kriuchkov, Lichnoe delo (M, 1997); V. 
Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva. Vzgliad iznutri (M, 1994); M. 
Nenashev, Zalozhnik vremeni (M, 1993); V. Pechenev, Vzlet i 
padenie Gorbacheva (M, 1996); V. Pribytkov, Apparat (St. 
Petersburg, 1995); G. Smirnov, Uroki minuvshego (M, 1997); V. 
Sukhanov, Sovetskoe pokolenie i Gennadii Ziuganov. Vremia 
reshitel'nykh (M, 1999); G. Shakhnazarov, Tsena
svobody.Reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika 
(1993); A. Cherniaev, 1991 god: dnevnik pomoshchnika Prezidenta 
SSSR (M, 1997); Cherniaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym. Po
Myth-Making as a Genre
A powerful feature of myth-making in the milieu of
Soviet officials, in particular, among those who took 
part in the formation of the Russian nationalist 
movement, was its exclusively oral nature. In 
conjunction with the myth's transmission, a 
crystallization of the avant-texte (the myth's base plot) 
in a clear and simple form devoid of superfluous details 
was simultaneously taking place, as well as its 
adaptation to new realities. As a result, a very dynamic 
oikos-tekst (or “eco-text,” the variant of the legend 
active at a given time and place), as it is called in 
folklore studies, was achieved, by which it was 
possible to explain and systematize any phenomenon or 
event—from international negotiations to everyday 
conflicts. An analogous phenomenon is the Soviet 
political anecdote, also a product of verbal culture. 
Many of these anecdotes endured for decades, since the 
narrator need only change the characters to the present 
day.14 Not for nothing the collection of anti-Semitic 
anecdotes frequently served as a password for members 
of the Russian nationalist movement in unfamiliar 
surroundings. The listener's reaction to these anecdotes 
served to chart his position on the spectrum of ethno- 
nationalistic ideology in general, and if the reaction 
was negative, the incident could always be passed off 
as an unsuccessful joke. However, the anti-Semitic or 
anti-Caucasian anecdote served merely to illustrate an 
entire set of fundamental myths, shared by members of 
the Russian nationalist movement (about Jews, about 
the Russian state, about Stalin). These myths were 
supported by a corpus of exemplary legends. 
Unfortunately, we cannot point to any one single text 
that was generally recognized by the Russian 
nationalists in the 1950s and 60s to be the fullest 
representation of the ethno-nationalist myths. However, 
this lack is partially filled by two literary works written 
by Russian nationalists and published by the state's 
presses: Valentin Ivanov's Golden Metal and Ivan 
Shevtsov's Louse.15 Both authors later took an active
dnevnikovym zapisiam (M, 1993); A. Iakovlev, Gor'kaia chasha 
(Yaroslavl, 1994). Even the enterprising L. Onikov, a liberal official
in the Central Committee, when describing in his book the various
faults of this institution, uses the term “nationalism” only in the case
of anti-Russian sentiments voiced in the Central Asian republics 
(KPSS: anatmoiia raspada. Vzgliad iznutri apparata TsK [M, 1996]). 
This is all the more surprising, considering his interest in the problem 
of anti-Semitism. It is interesting to note that the memoirs written by 
former officials of the Central Committee were largely penned by the 
fairly liberal members of the International Department and aides to 
the general secretaries for the years 1970-1980 (these categories
overlap to a significant degree). The memoirs of officials in the 
Central Committee during the period of the 1950s and 60s represent 
a much more modest contribution.
14 See, for example, Istoriia SSSR v anekdotakh. 1917-1992, edited 
by M. Dubovskii (Smolensk, 1991).
15 V. Ivanov, Zheltyi metall (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1956) and 
I. Shevtsov, Tlia (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1963). In 1957
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part in the Russian nationalist movement and were 
considered members of the “Russian Party” that 
commenced its operations in the late 1960s.
In addition, I have analyzed the annotated catalog 
of cases from the USSR Procurator's Office on Anti-
Soviet Agitation and Propaganda,”* 16 both as a source to 
define the ethno-nationalistic mythology and to aid in 
my evaluation of the dissemination of the primary 
myths and the different social groups involved. This 
catalog contains brief entries on approximately 60 
percent of all those imprisoned for anti-Soviet agitation 
and propaganda for the period from March 5, 1953 
through 1991.17 Although I have used data for a 
somewhat shorter time period, from March 5, 1953 
through January 1, 1987, the number of cases thus 
excluded is quite small when compared to the total 
number.
The Myth about Jews and Caucasians
The fundamental myth of the Russian nationalists 
in the party-state apparatus, which was handed down to 
the movement of the Russian nationalists, goes like 
this: all Jews (“Zionist” or “Troskyite” is often used 
instead of the word “Jew”) are inclined to conspiracies, 
possess certain general characteristics (as a rule, 
negative ones), are connected by mutual responsibility 
and help their own kind. In addition, they produce 
nothing useful, but “they eat Russian bread.” They 
don't like Russians or the state in which they live, and 
are inclined to betrayal, often with the assistance or at 
the request of their relatives in the West. Given the 
chance, they are prepared to flee abroad with all the 
wealth that they have accumulated in Russia.
A large measure of this myth undoubtedly bears a 
pre-revolutionary stamp (for example, the idea that 
Jews are potential betrayers compelled the tsarist 
government in World War I to resettle several 
hundreds of thousands of people from the Pale of 
Settlement to central Russia); the myth, however, 
underwent a significant transformation during its 
resurgence among the political elite in the 1930s and 
40s and its utilization in propaganda in 1948-53. The 
Soviet fundamental myth about Jews differs in 
important respects from its pre-revolutionary variant, 
most notably, in its racist features. If before the
Glavlit was compelled to remove Ivanov's “book from circulation,
since it contained hooligan attacks on Georgians and other Soviet
peoples” (see “Zapiska otdela propagandy i agitatsii TsK KPSS po
soiuznym respublikam i otdela kul'tury TsK KPSS,” Ideologicheskie 
komissii TsK KPSS, 1958-1964: Dokumenty (M, 1998), 76.
16 “58-10. Nadzornye proizvodstva Prokuratury SSSR po delam ob 
antisovetskoi agitatsii i propagande: annotirovannyi katalog, mart 
1953-1991,” edited by V. A. Kozlova and S. V. Mironenko (M, 
1999).
17 Ibid., 6.
Revolution Jewishness was defined, above all, as a 
religious affiliation, in the atheistic USSR the 
definition of the Jew and Jewishness came to be 
defined by the racist “principle of blood.” For those 
who wished to appear to be Russian in the eyes of 
those around them (particularly those who were ill 
disposed towards them) one not only had to have the 
“correct” entry in one's passport, but one also must 
possess the right facial composition, name and 
patronymic, accent and everyday customs. An even 
more significant transformation took place in regard to 
the Caucasians, in particular, those members of the 
region's Christian peoples: Georgians, Armenians, and 
Ossetians. Among Russian nationalists the pre-
revolutionary positive regard for their “Orthodox 
brethren” disappears completely, and is replaced by a 
firm dislike for all “dark” people, above all, the 
Orthodox Georgians. Virtually all the negative qualities 
ascribed to Jews are heaped on them, with the 
exception of miserliness and potential for betrayal to a 
foreign enemy.
The “Caucasian” theme for our purposes is 
optional, since the Russian nationalist movement from 
the second half of the 1950s until the mid-1970s did 
not see serious enemies in the people of the Caucasus. 
It does, however, require some commentary. The myth 
about the Caucasians in the 1950s through the 1980s 
underwent a certain evolution. In the first half of the 
1950s, when the Politburo membership included 
several people of Caucasian origin (Stalin, Beria, 
Mikoyan), Caucasians were accused (as a rule, along 
with Jews) of seizing political power in the country and 
exploiting the Russian people. The well-known Soviet 
writer Konstantin Simonov recalls in his memoirs that 
already in 1933 a leaflet, entitled “And the Slavs Began 
to Argue Who Should Rule Russia,” was circulated 
among the students of the Factory-Manufacturing 
School. The leaflet portrayed Trotsky, Kamenev, and 
Zinoviev on one side of a river, and Stalin, Enukidze 
and Mikoyan (or Ordzhonikidze) on the other.18 Later, 
for example in 1947-52, in Leningrad one member of 
the Communist Party “engaged in sending anonymous 
letters (29 letters came to light), in which he wrote that 
the Russian people in the USSR are in a state of 
oppression, and that ‘in many spheres Jews hold sway,' 
‘the union of the butchers of the Caucasus and the Jews 
has become the enslaver of the Russians,' ‘the peasant 
is being fleeced by the butchers' and so forth. The 
anonymous letters also contained calls to disseminate 
these appeals.”19 In Ivanov's novel this idea is set forth 
in the guise of the history of the rogue “Prince
18 K. Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia (M, 1988), 44-
45.
19 A. Vakser, 97.
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Tsinandalsky” who has made the Russian Dunya20 fall 
in love with him. Tsinandalsky scandalously extorts 
money from Dunya, who yearns for the “beautiful 
life.”21
The table below shows the number of ethnic 
Russians, as well as those who spoke in the name of 
the Russian people (Belorussians, Ukrainians, Komi), 
arrested throughout the entire territory of the former 
Soviet Union for ethno-nationalist acts (declarations, 
speeches, letters, leaflets, etc.).






Anti-Georgian 16 5 of these took 





Pro-Fascist 17 Called himself a 
Fascist, praised 










sentiments aimed at 
other nationalities
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In comparison with the total number of cases 
inventoried in the catalog (approximately 3,500) the 
number of cases related to Russian nationalists is quite 
small. True, not all of the cases in the catalog are 
described with the same degree of detail and it is 
possible that a significant number of the cases 
instituted for “slanderous pronouncements aimed at 
one of the state's leaders” or “anti-Soviet letters” also 
falls within the parameters of our study, just as they 
may have no bearing whatsoever. However, for the 
calculation of quantitative indicators they are 
sufficient—almost 100 cases comprise an adequate 
selection. From the numbers given in Table 1 it is clear
20 The name Dunya is synonymous with Russian provincialism.
21 See the memoirs of A. Mikoian, who becomes offended by
Khrushchev when the latter suspects him of having ties with Beria in
1953, only because they are both Caucasians. (Mikoian, Tak bylo. 
Razmyshleniia o minuvshem [M, 1999], 588.)
that even out of the total number of cases in the entire 
study, anti-Georgian xenophobic invectives account for 
18 percent of the total of xenophobic utterances, 
following purely anti-Semitic invectives, which 
account for 35 percent of the total number of cases.22 
However, if we take mid-1954 as our time period 
(Stalin and Beria are both gone), the number of anti-
Semitic and anti-Georgian cases is identical—12; 
moreover, during the same period there are only 11 
cases for acts directed at all other nations combined. 
From mid-1954, after the disappearance from power of 
all the Georgian leaders, the Russian nationalists were 
preoccupied, by and large, with the Jews.
In the 1970s the Russian nationalists once again 
claimed that Russians were being exploited by 
Caucasians (above all, Georgians). Insofar as large 
northern wages were spent at collective farm markets 
for much-needed vitamins for the residents of the 
Russian North and Siberia, brought from Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, while the “shabashniki” (seasonal workers) 
from Armenia and Chechnya were engaged in seasonal 
construction work in the depopulated towns outside the 
black earth belt, earning by Soviet standards enormous 
sums of money, the village prose writers, giving voice 
to the prevailing stereotypes, accused the Caucasians of 
speculation (see Viktor Astafyev, Fishing for Minnows 
and Vasily Belov, The Eves).
The primary myth for the Russian nationalists, 
however, remained that of anti-Semitism. The books by 
Valentin Ivanov and Ivan Shevtsov, largely written in 
the early 1950s, clearly illustrate this, even though they 
were published after Stalin's death and the 
rehabilitation of those involved in the Doctors' Plot. In 
both books, the main hero, a young Russian who has 
served at the front, is engaged in a struggle with a 
group of Jews who are older, experienced, and 
naturally, who did not fight in the war. Both of these 
novels include one peripheral, positive character who is 
Jewish—clearly for the benefit of the censorship. In a 
recent interview Shevtsov admitted as much: “I used 
him like a lighting rod,” he stated, referring to the 
young sculptor Yakov Kantsel in his novel The Louse; 
Kantsel is run over by a car for refusing to collaborate 
with the cosmopolites.23 *
The main subject of Ivanov's novel Golden Metal 
is the creation by the Jews of a system to steal gold 
from the Siberian mines and sell it abroad. The roles of
22 It's possible that such a large percentage of cases (approximately
one-third) instituted in Georgia was brought about by the specific 
nature of the local MGB-KGB. It is hardly likely that local
inhabitants in other Caucasian republics, who were Russian by 
nationality, were so sparing of expressing negative attitudes about 
representatives of the native peoples of these states, but evidently the 
authorities were more tolerant.
23 Iu. Vasil'ev, “Tlia masonskaia,” Moskovskie novosti, 19-25
December 2000.
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negative heroes are filled out with Georgians, Old 
Believers, Tatars, Kazhdars (Iranians), a Little Russian 
kulak and Russian alcoholics.
Shevtsov, an army journalist, was on friendly terms 
with prominent Soviet sculptors and artists—leaders of 
the fine arts in the late Stalin period (for example, A. 
Gerasimov, E. Vuchetich, N. Tomsky, and P. Korin). 
In his novel The Louse he expressed their point of view 
on the conditions obtaining in Soviet art. A handful of 
young Russian “realist” artists finds itself in opposition 
with the more experienced Jewish art critics whose 
sympathies lay with abstract art. The chief authority for 
the Jews—the artist Barselonsky (a parody of Ilya 
Ehrenburg)—has ties with foreign countries and certain 
officials who protect him. Together they hound the 
Russian “realists.”
The Legend about the “Kremlin Wives”
In addition to the primary myth about the Jews, 
several additional legends were elaborated in the 
1930s-50s, which while less significant, nonetheless 
saw fairly frequent use.
The essence of the legend about the “Kremlin 
wives” maintained that thanks to Stalin, Jews no longer 
held positions of power in the bureaucracy, especially 
at the highest levels (some considered certain high- 
placed officials to be “hidden Jews”—but that 
represented an “extreme” view); nevertheless the 
“Zionists” were “carrying on their politics” as before 
through the wives of members of the Politburo (above 
all, Leonid Brezhnev). Insofar as Kremlin etiquette 
restricted as much as possible information about the 
personal lives of the leaders, “specialists” formed their 
conjectures on the ethnic origins of the leadership's 
spouses based on their names (for example, the name 
of Brezhnev's wife Viktoria Petrovna was considered 
to be “Jewish”) or their personal appearance.
It was precisely the legend about the “Kremlin 
wives” that explained for the ethno-nationalists the 
incomprehensible indifference of many highly placed 
officials to the ideas of Russian nationalism. For this 
very reason, the “chauvinist” Vyacheslav Molotov 
(according to A. Mikoyan),24 though married to a well- 
known government figure of Jewish origins, Polina 
Zhemchuzhina, in the 1970s was a more respected 
figure in the ethno-nationalist pantheon than Brezhnev 
or Suslov, since the Jewish origins of their wives was 
discussed, but no authoritative sources of information 
were forthcoming.
The first mention of the existence of this legend 
dates from March 1953. According to the annotated 
catalog cited above, “58-10. USSR Procurator's Office 
on Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda,” on March 
7, 1953 a certain N. I. Slezkin (born 1909, Russian
24 Mikoian, 581.
member of the KPSS, resident of the city of Smolensk, 
and, of no small importance, the director of the 
regional spirits trust) recorded in his diary:
All Jews should be deported from the USSR, I didn't 
like Molotov because Zhemchuzhnaya [sic!] was his 
wife, she tried to make an attempt on the life of 
Comrade Stalin, which has been exposed. The politics 
of the Jews can be summed up as trying to worm 
themselves into the government, even by such means as 
marriage to one of the members of the government, and 
then carry out their acts.”25
Thus, already at the time the Stalin era was drawing to 
a close, the legend about the “Kremlin wives” was 
sufficiently widely disseminated to capture the 
imagination of a member of the provincial elite.
In Shevtsov's book the legend about the “Kremlin 
wives” (without using that term) comes into play three 
times. Positive heroes are offered the opportunity to 
marry negative characters—Jewish women. And in the 
only instance when this succeeds, the positive but 
weak-willed hero “ruins himself” and begins to “pursue 
the policy” of his wife and her relatives. If the author's 
statement is correct and the novel was written around 
1952, and if the main plot lines indeed did not undergo 
major changes in later editions, then the myth about the 
“Kremlin wives” possibly took shape in the 1940s. In 
any case, there is no doubt that Shevtsov was familiar 
with it. In his memoirs he recalls a meeting with the 
writer S. N. Sergeev-Tsensky in 1958 at which this 
subject was discussed. Shevtsov made the following 
remarks at this meeting: “The institution of wives is a 
Zionist strategy. This situation can be found not only in 
art and literature, but also in the highest spheres of 
power.”26 The earliest recorded use of the term 
“Kremlin wives” that I have been able to trace is to be 
found in V. Ganichev's memoirs in connection with his 
work at the journal Molodaya Gvardiya in the mid- 
1960s. He writes that the editor-in-chief of this journal, 
A. Nikonov, gave him lists of the “Kremlin wives” so 
that he might familiarize himself with them. This 
means that the legend had already developed quite 
substantially and that it had shifted from the verbal 
level to the written.27 *One of the more active Russian 
nationalists, S. Semanov, compiled a list of the 
“Kremlin wives” in the second half of the 1960s. A 
copy of his list (undated) with the names of the 
“Kremlin wives” and deciphered pseudonyms of the 
leaders of the Russian Communist Party and the All-
Union Communist Party during the 1920s and 30s can 
be found in the author's archive.
25 “58-10. Nadzornye proizvodstva Prokuratury SSSR po delam ob
antisovetskoi agitatsii i propagande,” 92.
26 Shevtsov, 455.
27 See “Velichie i padenie ‘Molodoi Gvardii,'” Nash Sovremennik, 9
(1997):200.
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The idea of the perfidious influence of these Jewish 
wives (real or mythical)—and later the Jewish sons- 
and daughters-in-law—on the social and political 
views of those people who were ethnically pure in the 
eyes of the Russian nationalists was utilized rather 
widely later as well.
The reverse of this legend was represented by 
Freudian motifs in the work of the Russian nationalists 
themselves. Virtually all of the works written in the 
1950s through the early 1980s present the subject of 
Russian-Jewish rivalry for a Russian woman, or a 
Russian wife who is the victim of a negative Jewish 
character. In Shevtsov's novel this rivalry comprises 
one of the central lines of the narrative. Maya 
Kaganskaya has made similar observations in her 
analysis of science fiction written by Russian 
nationalists in the 1970s through the early 1980s.28 In 
general, the sexual rivalry between Russians and 
representatives of other ethnic groups is a constant 
theme in the works of Russian nationalists, beginning 
with Valentin Ivanov, who expressed this subject so 
clearly that it attracted the attention of the Central 
Committee.
The Legend about the “Tashkent Front”
The essence of this legend holds that while all the 
peoples of the USSR—above all, Russians—were 
fighting the Fascists, the Jews sat out the war in the 
rear, busy with their “cushy jobs.” The thinking behind 
this legend maintains that the Jews were saved only 
thanks to the Russians; therefore, in the first place, the 
Jews should be eternally grateful to the Russians, and, 
second, it follows that it is inadmissible on these 
grounds to call the Russians—above all, Russian 
nationalists—“anti-Semites” or “Fascists.”
The legend about the “Tashkent Front” was widely 
disseminated throughout the Soviet Union and was in 
no way restricted to the milieu of the party-state 
apparatus. More likely than not, this myth did not come 
into being in the organs of power, although they 
certainly contributed a great deal to its formation. The 
true cause was the following: during the swift advance 
of German forces in the summer of 1941 the first to be 
evacuated were urban dwellers, approximately half of 
which in Ukrainian, Belorussian and Moldavian cities 
were Jewish.29 In the places of evacuation shelter for 
the refugees—hungry, poor and burdened with 
children—was to be rendered by a population that was 
just as poor and half-starved, which nevertheless was 
working day and night for the state. The Jewish 
evacuees with their poor Russian and “provincial”
28 M. Kaganskaia, “Mif dvadtsat' pervogo veka ili Rossiia vo mgle,” 
Strana i mir, 1 (1987), 131-40.
29 P. Polian, “Nakanune voiny i genotsida. Sovetskie evrei i perepisi 
1939 g,” Russkaia Mysl',1999, 9-15.09.
habits stood out among the urban populations of the 
Urals, Siberia and Central Asia, which had become less 
heterogeneous after the purges of the 1920s and 30s. 
Therefore, both in the Asiatic regions of the RSFSR 
and in the cities of the Central Asian republics, 
populated in this period to a large extent by people 
with Slavic ethnic origins,30 the appearance of the 
Jewish evacuees provoked a rather negative reaction.31 
Moreover, evacuated some two or three months earlier 
than residents of Central Russia, the Ukrainian, 
Belorussian and Moldavian Jews managed to find jobs 
and housing. The subsequent waves of refugees 
(primarily Russians and western Ukrainians) arrived 
when work and housing were much more difficult to 
obtain, which also fomented attacks of anti-Semitism.
Widespread anti-Semitism in the rear and the army 
in the field (through new reinforcements and soldiers 
who returned to the army after medical treatment) led 
to the formation of the persistent myth of the “Tashkent 
Front,” a myth that still has resonance today. The 
regime, for its part, in the framework of the long-term 
anti-Semitic campaign begun in 1942, kept silent about 
the role of Jews in the war, despite the fact that on 
many counts (the number of recipients of awards, the 
number of Heroes of the Soviet Union, the number of 
generals32) Jews, not counting assimilated Jews and 
those who were registered as Russians, in a rather 
strange contest for collective contribution to the 
Victory over the Germans according to ethnic origin 
held fourth place among all peoples of the USSR.33
Russian nationalists made the most of the legend 
about the “Tashkent Front.” In Shevtsov's novel one 
Jewish character makes the following comment: “You, 
Borya, fought the war in Tashkent.”34 Ivanov went 
much further and accused the Jews, to a man, of hiding 
from the war in the rear and engaging in illegal 
commercial dealings, as well as creating a secret 
network that worked for the Fascists. Should they be 
exposed, they supposedly were able to buy themselves 
freedom, after paying somebody from Beria's circle.
The members of the Russian nationalist movement 
elaborated this legend, using it both to deny the facts of 
anti-Semitism in the USSR and at the same time to 
repudiate accusations aimed at themselves. Moreover, 
this was accomplished by knowingly juggling the facts.
30 Slavs numerically predominated in the populations of three of the 
five capitals of Central Asian republics: Alma-Ata, Ashkhabad and 
Frunze. Their percentage of the population was high as well in
Tashkent and Dushanbe, and other major cities, for example,
Chimkent, Samarkand, Fergana and Leninabad.
31 G. Kostyrchenko, “V plenu u krasnogo faraona,” 15-16.
32 On May 15, 1945, 102 generals of the front-line army forces were 
Jewish. Compare: 2272 Russians, 286 Ukrainians, 157 Belorussians, 
25 Armenians, 19Latvians, 17 Poles, Tatars and Georgians, 12 each. 
Istochnik, 2 (1996):148.
33 G. Kostyrchenko, V plenu u krasnogo faraona, 20.
34 Shevtsov, 86.
27
The Soviet army turned out to be the savior of the 
Jews, although clearly it had at no time set itself that as 
an objective, but was defending the territorial integrity 
of the country and the existing political system. For 
example, N. Starshinov, a member of the Russian 
nationalist movement, refutes Yevgeny Yevtushenko 
with the following words: “And this is written about 
that very same army, three-fourths of which was 
comprised of Russian soldiers, which saved the Jews 
from complete annihilation by Hitler's forces!”35
Legends about Pseudonyms
and the “Doctors-Assassins”
The essence of the legend about pseudonyms 
maintains that Jews are playing a dishonest game by 
adopting Russian surnames or neutral pseudonyms, in 
order to push through their own agenda. If they had not 
adopted pseudonyms, then “Russian people” would 
know who the real author of these ideas was.
The roots of the legend about pseudonyms go back 
to the late 1930s, when Jews who worked as journalists 
in the central media were forced to adopt Russian 
pseudonyms.36 In the second half of the 1940s and the 
early 1950s, concurrent with the campaign for 
exposing pseudonyms in the literary world, more and 
more Jews working in various fields were compelled to 
adopt pseudonyms or change their names, as well as 
the names of their children, to neutral or Slavic 
surnames. This was particularly true for those families 
who had assimilated or who were striving for that, 
since being able to keep a prestigious job, enrolling in 
an institution of higher learning, and later, the 
opportunity to travel abroad all depended on having the 
“correct and proper” surname, name and patronymic.
The legend about pseudonyms permitted the 
members of the Russian nationalist movement to 
accuse any person (as a rule, behind his/her back) of 
being a “hidden” Jew, and to give his name a “Jewish” 
accent (for example, Mikhail Posokhin, the chief 
architect of Moscow, was called “Peisokhin”).
The legend about the “doctors-assassins” (who 
supposedly poisoned Stalin) came into being 
immediately after Stalin's death. In essence, it repeats 
the propagandistic purposes from the period of the 
Doctors' Plot now extrapolated to include Stalin's 
death. As far as public opinion was concerned, as well 
as officialdom, the public declaration of the doctors' 
innocence and the revocation of the honors awarded to 
the plot's detector effectively put an end to this story.
35 N. Starshinov, Chto bylo, to bylo... (Moscow: Zvonnitsa-MG,
1998), 370.
36 B. Efimov, Moi vek (Moscow: Agraf, 1998), 147. This practice 
continued much later as well. About similar precedents in the
editorial staff of Komsomol'skaia Pravda in the 1960s, see my
interview with V. Borshchov.
The legend, however, continued to live on among a 
certain segment of committed Russian nationalists. 
Moreover, the legend underwent a transformation—the 
accent was shifted from the deaths of the unpopular 
and quickly forgotten Zhdanov and Shcherbakov (of 
which the “poisoners” had been accused) to the violent 
death of Stalin, the beloved idol of the majority of the 
Russian nationalists.
The Legend about the Jewish Revolutionaries
In the second half of the 1960s, after the swift rise 
of anti-Communist and pro-monarchy fractions in the 
Russian nationalist movement (which included a 
significant number of officials from the Central 
Committee of the KPSS, the All-Union Lenin Young 
Communist League and the Soviet of Ministers of the 
RSFSR), a new legend about the Jewish revolutionaries 
took hold and was gradually disseminated throughout 
the party apparatus. According to this legend, the 
Jewish revolutionaries supposedly acted to further their 
own mystical and selfish interests by demolishing the 
Russian Empire; moreover, they were and remain 
committed to the destruction of Russian culture as a 
whole. The point behind this legend is that all 
responsibility for the negative and bloody episodes in 
the Revolution is firmly placed on the Jews, while the 
Russian people are given the role of innocent victim 
who has been deceived.
The legend about the Jewish revolutionaries was
borrowed from Russian emigre writings of the 1930s 
and partly from Nazi propaganda as well. Literature, 
for example, Andrei Dikii's Jews in the USSR, was 
actively brought into the Soviet Union by the artist Ilya 
Glazunov, well-known advocate of Orthodox and pro-
monarchy views, and later by others in his circle. 
Former emigrants, who by various paths found 
themselves in the USSR and after 1955 gradually 
regained their freedom, became another source. For 
example, V. Shulgin, who in the 1960s and 70s had 
become an object of pilgrimage for members of the 
Russian nationalist movement, and A. Kazem-Bek, 
who voluntarily returned to the USSR in 1948 and for 
many years worked on the editorial board of the 
Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. Nazi sources 
were studied in the libraries by such young scholars as
S. Semanov and V. Skurlatov.
The Myth about the Russian State
Apart from the myth about Jews, other myths had 
currency among the Russian nationalists, myths that 
had no connection with the Jewish problem, for 
example, the racist myth about the Russian state. 
According to this myth, the USSR is the legitimate heir 
to the Russian Empire, a state created by ethnic 
Russians—for ethnic Russians. In accordance with this
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myth only ethnic Russians have the right to rule this 
state at the present time, and they should comprise, at 
the very least, the “qualified majority” in all prestigious 
spheres, including government, defense, trade and 
science. In every concrete case, faced with the choice 
of giving an important position to a Russian or to a 
person of different ethnic background, preference 
should be given to the “creator of the state.” (There 
exists a variant of this system, by which representation 
is determined by the percentage of the ethnic group in 
the general population.)
The myth about the Russian state clearly runs 
counter not only to historical fact, but also to the 
principles of the Russian Empire, in which relations 
with its citizens was determined in accordance with 
their loyalty and creed. However, by the 1950s 
memory of the polyethnic elite in the governmental 
bureaucracy of the Russian Empire no longer existed. 
Young bureaucrats, and even the intellectuals, believed 
in the Stalinist propaganda that had been fed to them as 
children and adolescents in the second half of the 
1930s through the 1950s, propaganda that affirmed the 
priority of the ethnic Russian factor.
The Myth about Stalin
The myth about Stalin represented one part of the 
fundamentally statist consciousness of the Russian 
nationalists. The myth goes something like this: Joseph 
Stalin was a great leader, who built a mighty state in a 
history-breaking short span of time. He loved the 
Russian people boundlessly, and he fought against the 
Jews. The sense behind the myth is that a leader like 
Stalin is what's needed at the present time.
The myth about Stalin came into being among the 
young officials who entered the Central Committee in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s (A. Shelepin's group, 
for example). They were treated with affection by 
Stalin and retained their attachment for him, despite 
Khrushchev's revelations. It would still take rather a 
long time to convince some of the soundness of the 
myth about Stalin, for example, the Russian 
nationalists who had not gone through the school of the 
party-state apparatus, the young humanities students of 
the mid-1950s, and the “village” school of the 1960s. If 
such a figure as Ivan Shevtsov, who had connections 
with the highest echelons of Stalinist elite culture, 
represents a highly placed government official who 
illustrates the myth about Stalin, a father bequeathing 
his daughter with the duty to continue the struggle with 
the abstractionists and the Jews, then Valentin Ivanov 
is clearly an anti-Communist who reduces the 
Caucasian Stalin to the role of a Georgian rascal who 
seduced girls visiting on holiday. However, in the 
course of the second half of the 1950s through the early 
1980s the influence of the myth about Stalin gained 
more and more momentum; as a result, for all practical
purposes it supplanted the initial anti-Stalinist views 
held by a segment of the Russian nationalists. In this 
myth Stalin as a statesman appeared to be stronger and 
more effective than the present leaders, while the 
“individual mistakes” about which his Central 
Committee and Glavlit (the censorship) kept their 
silence, looked insignificant when compared to the 
obvious defects of the Brezhnev government.
The collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring 
about a significant change in the worldview of the 
former party and state bureaucrats. Only a handful of 
them were able to look at their past actions with 
different eyes and repent that they had been rather big 
cogs in the machine of a heartless government. The 
overwhelming majority of the former high state 
officials, if they did not retire, accepted the new rules 
of the game, without truly comprehending the crux of 
the matter in the changes that had taken place.
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